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When it was launched in 2005, the European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) was 
projected to have prices of around €30/ton CO2 and to be a cornerstone of the EU’s climate policy. 
The reality was a cascade of falling prices, a ballooning privately held emissions bank, and a 
decade of low prices providing inadequate incentive to drive investment in the technologies and 
innovation necessary to achieve long-term climate goals. The European Commission responded 
with administrative measures, including postponing the introduction of allowances (backloading) 
and using a quantity-based criterion for regulating future allowance sales (the market stability 
reserve); although prices are beginning to recover, it is far from clear whether these measures 
will adequately support the price into the future.  
In the meantime, governments have been turning away from carbon pricing and adopting 
overlapping regulatory measures that reinforce low prices and further undermine the confidence 
in market-based approaches to addressing climate change. The solution in other carbon markets 
has been the introduction of a reserve price that would set a minimum price in allowance auctions. 
Opponents of an auction reserve price in the EU ETS have expressed concern that a minimum 
auction price would interfere with economic operations in the market or would be tantamount to 
a tax, which would trigger a decision rule requiring unanimity among EU Member States. This 
Article reviews the economic and legal arguments for and against an auction reserve price. Our 
economic analysis concludes that an auction reserve price is necessary to accommodate 
overlapping policies and for the allowance market to operate efficiently. Our legal analysis 
concludes that an auction reserve price is not a “provision primarily of a fiscal nature,” nor would 
it “significantly affect a Member State's choice between different energy sources.” We describe 
two pathways through which a reserve price could be introduced.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) is, by the European 
Commission’s own description, “a cornerstone of the EU's policy to combat climate change and 
its key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively.”1 When the EU ETS was 
launched in 2005, the Commission was projecting average prices for European Union Allowances 
(EUAs) to be €30/ton CO2.2 However, once trading began in earnest in 2008, allowance prices 
quickly fell, and they spent the better part of the last decade hovering below €10. Economic 
modeling indicates these price levels are insufficient to promote the necessary innovation and 
abatement activities to meet Europe’s decarbonization goals cost-effectively, calling into question 
the centrality of the ETS to EU climate policy.3 The EU Renewable Energy Directive provides 
direct support for the expansion of renewable energy sources,4 but at current—and expected—
allowance price levels, emitting entities covered by the ETS have little incentive to change their 
carbon usage. At such low carbon prices, it is difficult to see the ETS living up to its purpose as 
the cornerstone of an effective climate policy. 
The persistence of low allowance prices—along with the accumulation of a substantial 
privately held bank of allowances well in excess of a one-year emissions budget—led the 
Commission to review the performance of the ETS and consider options “to tackle the growing 
structural supply-demand imbalance.”5 The first chosen measure was “backloading,” by which 
allowances were withheld from auction, with the commitment to reintroduce them later when 
prices were higher and the market was more stable. Focus then turned to the market stability 
reserve (MSR), a system to manage the issuance of allowances in response to the quantity of 
unused allowances that remain in circulation and have not yet been surrendered for compliance. 
The implementation of backloading of Phase 3 allowances from 2014 to 2016 and the proposal 
                                                 
1 European Commission, EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en. 
2 European Commission, Draft Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying Document 
to the Commission Decision Determining a List of Sectors and Subsectors Which Are Deemed to Be Exposed to a 
Significant Risk of Carbon Leakage Pursuant to Article 10a (13) of Directive 2003/87/EC, 24.12.2009, SEC(2009) 
10251 final. 
3 NICHOLAS STERN & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL COMMISSION ON CARBON PRICES (2017); O. 
Edenhofer, C. Flachsland, C. Wolff, L.K. Schmid, A. Leipprand, N. Koch, U. Kornek, & M. Pahle, Decarbonization 
and EU ETS Reform: Introducing a Price Floor to Drive Low-Carbon Investments (Mercator Research Institute on 
Global Commons and Climate Change, MCC Policy Paper, Nov. 2017). 
4 Directive 2009/28/EC of 23 April 2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and 
Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, [2009] OJ L 140/16 (“Renewable 
Energy Directive”). 
5 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The State of the 
European Carbon Market in 2012, 14.11.2012 COM(2012) 652 final. 
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and adoption of the MSR scheme in 2014–15,6 along with a significant tightening of the proposed 
cap for Phase 4, did not result in significantly higher market prices. The tepid market response to 
these quantity-based approaches to managing the trading program appears to reflect a crisis of 
confidence in the ETS as a central mechanism for decarbonization.7 Only with the announcement 
at the end of 2017 of a mechanism to cancel excess allowances from the MSR starting in 2023 did 
price expectations begin to recover. However, given the MSR’s complexity and the multiplicity of 
factors influencing EUA price formation—including macroeconomic developments and 
overlapping regulations in energy markets—it is far from clear that investor expectations will 
remain strong and low prices will not return.  
The European Commission reviewed options for “discretionary price instruments” as part 
of the structural reform review of the EU ETS in 2012.8 However, a simple and common 
approach—setting an auction reserve (minimum) price in the auction of emissions allowances, 
below which new allowances would not be released into the market—was not given serious 
consideration. In conversations and presentations, Commission economists from DG CLIMA 
expressed concerns that the price-based character of an auction reserve price could qualify as being 
“primarily of a fiscal nature” (within the meaning of Article 192(2) TFEU, as we explain in Section 
3), thus requiring unanimity voting in the European Council. This was considered an 
insurmountable political hurdle, informed by the Commission’s unsuccessful attempt to introduce 
a carbon and energy tax in the 1990’s.9 However, no formal analysis of this legal question was 
ever commissioned. This article constitutes one of the first known attempts to conduct this 
analysis,10 and the balance of the evidence indicates that unanimity in the Council for the inclusion 
of an EU ETS auction reserve price in the existing system is not needed.  
At the same time, since Europe was a leader with the ETS, subsequent trading systems 
have learned from the EU’s experience. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a 
cooperative effort among ten northeastern states in the United States, held its first auction with a 
reserve price in 2008, designed in part in response to events observed in the EU ETS. 
Subsequently, the Waxman-Markey proposal for a national cap-and-trade program in the United 
                                                 
6 EP Legislative Observatory, Procedure File of Decision on Establishment and Operation of a Market Stability 
Reserve, 2014/0011(COD), Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 
2015 Concerning the Establishment and Operation of a Market Stability Reserve for the Union Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Trading Scheme and Amending Directive 2003/87/EC. 
7 B. Knopf, N.T. Koch, G. Grosjean, S. Fuss, C. Flachsland, M. Pahle, M. Jakob, & O. Edenhofer (PIK), The European 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS): Ex-Post Analysis, the Market Stability Reserve and Options for a 
Comprehensive Reform (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Nota di Lavoro 79.2014, 2014). 
8 European Commission, The State of the European Carbon Market in 2012, COM(2012) 652 at 9f. 
9 J.B. SKJÆRSETH & J. WETTESTAD, J., EU EMISSIONS TRADING: INITIATION, DECISION-MAKING AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 4-5 (2008). 
10 See S.E. WEISHAAR, CARBON PRICING: DESIGN, EXPERIENCE AND ISSUES 37 (L. Kreiser et al. eds., 2015). 
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States, which passed the House of Representatives in 2009,11 included an auction with a reserve 
price. Built on the observed success in RGGI, sequentially the California, Québec, and Ontario 
trading programs all have incorporated reserve prices into their auctions. Hence, it was surprising 
that in preparing for the fourth phase, the EU considered several mechanisms to promote market 
stability but did not give serious attention to an auction reserve price. Meanwhile, the United 
Kingdom had already introduced a domestic carbon floor price of £18/ton (around €20/ton) for 
electricity generation, and several other European countries have been contemplating a floor price 
for carbon emissions.12  
This Article considers the legal and economic case for incorporating an auction reserve 
price in the EU ETS. Section 2 lays out the economic case for incorporating a reserve price to 
improve auction efficiency, stabilize and support allowance price expectations, and increase social 
welfare. Section 3 develops the legal background for subsequently considering legal options for 
incorporating an auction reserve price in the EU ETS, discussed in Section 4. Section 5 considers 
additional practical policy issues, and Section 6 concludes. 
I. THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR AN AUCTION RESERVE PRICE 
In this section, we take an economics perspective on implementing an auction reserve price 
within the EU ETS. We discuss why it may be desirable to combine price with quantity 
mechanisms, why an auction reserve price is not considered a tax from an economics perspective, 
and the merits of an auction reserve price. 
A. Combining Price with Quantity Mechanisms 
Emissions markets are created to put a price on carbon that signals to society that carbon 
is costly and scarce, by setting quantity limits to emissions and allowing those emissions rights to 
be traded. One of the most challenging issues in the design and implementation of market-based 
approaches to regulation is managing uncertainty, regarding both the benefits and costs of 
emissions reductions, which may evolve over time and about which it may take years to reach 
scientific consensus. Policymakers may have expectations about what is an appropriate price range 
                                                 
11 H.R. 2452, 111th Cong. (2009). 
12 In 2016, France proposed a domestic €30/ton carbon price floor for power plants but ultimately dropped it. Germany 
considered lobbying for a “Europe-wide minimum price” for carbon (http://www.reuters.com/article/europe-carbon-
germany-idUSL5N181906). The Netherlands is also exploring the introduction of a floor price mechanism for the 
electricity sector similar to that in the UK 
(https://www.kabinetsformatie2017.nl/binaries/kabinetsformatie/documenten/publicaties/2017/10/10/regeerakkoord-
vertrouwen-in-de-toekomst/Regeerakkoord+2017-2021.pdf). 
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to bring forth clean technologies, induce innovation, or reflect the social cost of carbon, but they 
cannot know the true costs of abating emissions ex ante or what technological or macroeconomic 
shocks will occur.  
In theory, the emissions market should be a cost-effective mechanism that equates the 
marginal cost for meeting the carbon target across regulated entities, ensuring that emissions 
sources that can reduce emissions at least cost within a given compliance period will do so. Further, 
the ability to bank allowances is supposed to ensure that cost-effectiveness is achieved over time. 
Another attractive aspect of a cap-and-trade policy is that the regulator has instantaneous 
information about marginal cost, summarized in the allowance price. However, in practice, the 
value of price discovery is limited: overlapping policies and other factors interfere with the market 
and drive a wedge between the apparent and actual costs. For example, the EU Renewable Energy 
Directive forces more clean electricity generation to be implemented than would be cost-effective 
with carbon pricing under the ETS alone. By directing the market to reduce more emissions via 
relatively expensive renewables, less abatement will be done via other, less costly methods, 
leading allowance prices to fall. As a result, the actual costs of meeting the emissions target are 
higher while the allowance price is lower.13  
A related problem is the “waterbed effect”: if any EU Member State chooses to implement 
additional measures to further reduce emissions among their installations covered by the cap, those 
actions simply increase the amount of allowances available in other Member States and sectors. 
As a result, complementary policies are close to futile in reducing CO2 emissions, and they drive 
down the carbon price even further. Taken to the extreme, collective unilateral actions could 
ultimately render the EU ETS irrelevant, replacing it with a patchwork of national policies.  
In other words, with many overlapping policies, despite apparently low allowance prices, 
implicit carbon prices can be quite high and heterogeneous, meaning more cost-effective 
opportunities for reducing emissions can be missed. Low allowance prices can also entail higher 
costs in the long run because of weak incentives for technological innovation and adoption of 
cleaner technologies not otherwise supported by the additional policy measures. This lack of 
reliance on the market to help bring forth new and unforeseen technologies ultimately increases 
the cost of the transition to a low-carbon economy.  
                                                 
13 C. Fischer & L. Preonas, Combining Policies for Renewable Energy: Is the Whole Less Than the Sum of Its Parts? 
4 INT’L REV. ENERGY & RESOURCE ECON. 51 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1561/101.00000030. 
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Furthermore, uncertainty and price volatility have their own costs and can dampen 
investment incentives.14 For all these and other reasons, it may be desirable to combine price with 
quantity mechanisms to promote stability and better align allowance prices with the costs they are 
intended to reflect. 
In the early literature on emissions trading, the idea of a minimum price in an emissions 
market was characterized as requiring the government purchase of emissions allowances that had 
previously been distributed for free. Baumol and Oates describe the adverse dynamic properties 
this type of subsidy for emissions reductions would have.15 Their assumption was that firms have 
a property right to emissions and the government is buying back those rights. However, the advent 
of the polluter pays principle and the introduction of auctions include the ability to influence the 
minimum price in the market by associating an auction reserve price with the sale of new 
allowances. If the auction equilibrium price falls to the reserve price level, some or all of the 
allowances will not sell, and the constrained supply will support the market price.  
The European Commission states that an explicit carbon price objective “would alter the 
very nature of the current EU ETS being a quantity-based market instrument.”16 However, if the 
program is well designed, the reserve price should bind rarely if at all. In fact, if an auction reserve 
price prevails consistently, leaving allowances frequently unsold, it may be taken as a signal of 
structural problems in the program that should trigger a program review. Furthermore, not all 
operators have to pay the reserve price when it does prevail at auction. Some portion of the market, 
including industry, may receive allowances for free, as is currently the case. The value of that 
allocation is reinforced by the auction reserve price. Finally, it is important to note that a reserve 
price in the auction does not constitute a minimum price in the market. If the existing supply of 
allowances in secondary markets is sufficient relative to demand, the market price for allowances 
could fall below the reserve price; in this case, no new allowances would enter the market.17 For 
all these reasons, an auction reserve price is very different from a tax from an economics 
perspective, and we will show that it is also quite different from a legal perspective. 
                                                 
14 A. Lofgren, K. Millock & C. Nauges, The Effect of Uncertainty on Pollution Abatement Investments: Measuring 
Hurdle Rates for Swedish Industry, 30(4) RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 475 (2008) 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2008.09.002 
15 W.J. BAUMOL & W.E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2nd ed. 1988). 
16 See European Commission, supra note 5, at 10. 
17 S. Salant & M. Hasegawa, The Dynamics of Pollution Permits, 7 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 61 (2015). This 
condition was observed in the California trading program in 2016. RGGI’s emissions containment reserve applies 
only to a subset of allowances that are available to sell in the auction, so naturally, if supply and demand conditions 
merit, those allowances might not sell and the price could fall below the reserve price trigger. Analogously, when 
additional allowances have entered the program under RGGI’s cost containment reserve, once all those allowances 
were sold, the price temporarily rose above the reserve’s trigger price.  
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B. Merits of a Reserve Price 
The merits of an auction reserve price are well documented in the academic literature.18 
The arguments for having price (or cost) management mechanisms (also referred to as cost and 
emissions containment) have to do primarily with uncertainty regarding the marginal costs of 
reducing emissions but also with other uncertainties associated with external shocks to the system. 
The possibility of introducing a price ceiling to safeguard against (very) high allowance prices has 
been discussed and debated in the EU since the start of the scheme. A control mechanism to guard 
against unacceptably high prices and price volatility currently appears in the Directive,19 under the 
heading “Measures in the Event of Excessive Price Fluctuations,” but the merits and benefits of 
an auction reserve price have been much less discussed, and no explicit mechanism exists to guard 
against a fall in price. 
In fact, this focus on higher-than-expected costs (and hence high allowance prices) is in 
sharp contrast to what has been observed in practice. In almost all previous cap-and-trade 
programs, the costs to firms have been overestimated ex ante rather than underestimated.20 The 
typical scenario witnessed repeatedly in market-based regulation of air pollution is an initial high 
price as compliance entities build a modest allowance reserve, identify abatement options, and 
learn to trust the market, followed by a precipitous decline in price.21 The EU experience with low 
allowance prices has been shared by earlier trading schemes such as the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen 
dioxide trading programs in the United States and the subnational programs for CO2.
22  
The obvious way to implement a minimum price is with an auction reserve price, as long 
as a sufficient portion of the total allowance allocation is sold through an auction.23 Just as in many 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., D. Burtraw, K. Palmer, & D. Kahn, A Symmetric Safety Valve, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 4921 (2010); P.J. Wood 
& F. Jotzo, Price Floors for Emissions Trading, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1746 (2011). 
19 Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community, 
2003 O.J. (L 140) 63, Art. 29a (1): “If, for more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three 
times the average price of allowances during the two preceding years on the European carbon market, the Commission 
shall immediately convene a meeting of the Committee established by Article 9 of Decision No 280/2004/EC.”  
20 See W. Harrington, R.D. Morgenstern, & P. Nelson, On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297 (2000); Burtraw et al., supra note 18. 
21 D. Burtraw & A. Keyes, Recognizing Gravity as a Strong Force in Atmosphere Emissions Markets, 47 AGRIC. & 
RESOURCE ECON. REV. 201 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1017/age.2018.12. 
22 The exception is the RECLAIM program in Southern California, the only important program that did not allow 
emissions banking. Unfortunately, the ramp up of stringency of that program coincided with a disruption in the 
California electricity market, leading to a price spike and suspension of trading. The lesson from this is that any poorly 
designed program can fail. Cost management is a design element that, although one hopes it would not be invoked, 
would provide a safeguard against such a failure. 
23 C. Hepburn, M. Grubb, K. Neuhoff, F. Matthes, & M. Tse, Auctioning of EU ETS Phase II Allowances: How and 
Why? 6 CLIMATE POLICY 135 (2006); Å. Löfgren, D. Burtraw, M. Wråke, and A. Malinovskaya, Distribution of 
Allowance Asset Values and the Use of Auction Revenues in the EU Emissions Trading System, REVIEW OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY, 12 (2) 284–303. 
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online auctions, the reserve price represents a minimum acceptable bid. The academic literature 
and notorious examples of failed auctions point to a credible and efficient reserve price as an 
important feature of good auction design.24 If the market clearing price were to fall below the 
reserve price, some portion of allowances automatically would not be sold in the auction, thereby 
restricting the supply of allowances and supporting the market price.25  
Given an unpredictable price path, Burtraw and colleagues find that a minimum price—
independently or in combination with a price cap above which additional allowances are released 
into the market—significantly improves welfare and the performance of a trading program.26 If 
the allowance price is lower than expected when the cap is set, this would indicate emissions 
reductions are less expensive than anticipated. Assuming policymakers initially designed the 
program with a rough balancing of the incremental benefits and costs in mind, the realization of a 
low allowance price should trigger the desire to purchase greater emissions reductions. An auction 
reserve price is a rule that allows policymakers to embed such instructions in the program. 
Another important aspect of the reserve price is its potential to reduce uncertainty for 
investors regarding expectations of future allowance prices. By reducing or eliminating the low 
end of the distribution of possible allowance prices, a reserve price both lowers the variance in 
allowance prices and raises their expected value. Each of these aspects has a positive influence on 
the decision to invest in low-emitting technologies. Furthermore, an auction reserve price might 
reinforce auction revenues that could be used and invested in low-carbon innovation. Greater 
confidence about higher prices in the future can also support current prices because of the 
opportunity for banking current allowances for future compliance. If implemented in Phase 4 of 
the EU ETS, starting in 2020, an auction reserve price would be likely to influence allowance 
prices in the later years of Phase 3.27 If Phase 4 allowances are expected to be more valuable, firms 
will want to save Phase 3 allowances for later use, driving up current demand.  
By discouraging excess downward price adjustments, a reserve price would help address 
the repercussions of the aforementioned waterbed effect—that is, the risk that Member States by 
introducing complementary policies will undermine the functions of the ETS. When the cap 
                                                 
24 K. Binmore & P. Klemperer, The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses, 112 ECON. J. 
C74 (2002); L. Ausubel & P. Cramton, Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing, 23 ECON. THEORY 493 (2004); S.E. 
WEISHAAR, EMISSIONS TRADING DESIGN: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW (2014), S.E. WEISHAAR, F.G. TICHE,  ECONOMICS 
AND REGULATION IN CHINA (M. Faure, G. Xu, eds., 2014).  
25 The degree of support depends in part on the disposition of unsold allowances. See Section 5 for an in-depth 
discussion about how to design an auction within the EU ETS with a reserve price, also in concert with the existing 
MSR.  
26 See Burtraw et al., supra note 18. 
27 K. Neuhoff, A. Schopp, R. Boyd, K. Stelmakh, & A. Vasa, Banking of Surplus Emissions Allowances (DIW Berlin, 
Discussion Paper 1196, 2012), http://www.diw.de/discussionpapers. 
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remains unchanged, overlapping policies to reduce emissions in some jurisdiction will push prices 
downward and emissions up elsewhere within the EU. A reserve price that leads to cancellation of 
allowances thus helps make these policies truly additional. 
Finally, a rule-based approach such as an auction reserve price can automatically adjust the 
stringency of the cap-and-trade program in response to new information about costs without 
waiting for administrative action. In other words, cap stringency is set in anticipation of likely 
costs; low allowance prices reveal that the cap could have been more ambitious to balance the 
societal benefits of emissions reductions. An auction reserve price provides an adjustment to 
improve this balance that is automatic and transparent.  
The Commission states: “A stable carbon price signal is one of the elements that can 
improve the investment climate for low-carbon investments.”28 We argue that the introduction of 
an auction reserve price in the EU ETS would provide a nondiscretionary, rule-based approach 
that can be anticipated by market participants and thereby stabilize the market, and thus it would 
have a positive effect on investments in nonemitting technologies.  
In sum, an auction reserve price has the following merits: it mitigates problems with 
overlapping policies; it increases cost-effectiveness, allowing a more efficient distribution of 
abatement measures over sectors and over time; and it provides transparency and predictability. It 
also increases value to allowance holders (discussed further in Section 5).  
II. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR AN AUCTION RESERVE PRICE IN THE EU 
In this section, we review the core principles for the derivation and circumscription of EU 
legislative powers, particularly as related to environmental, energy, and fiscal policies. The 
preconditions for the exercise of EU powers, as well as the implications of EU decision-making 
for the Member States’ ability to pursue their own policies, differ among policy areas. In particular, 
under EU law, legal acts pertaining to specific policy areas require unanimous consent of the 
Council members (i.e., the Member States) to be adopted. To understand whether an auction 
reserve price would trigger or escape this unanimity rule, or encounter other challenges relating to 
the precondition for exercise of EU legislative power, one must first understand the legal 
foundations.  
                                                 
28 European Commission, Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2003/87/EC to Enhance Cost-Effective 
Emission Reductions and Low-Carbon Investments, 15.7.2015 SWD(2015) 135 final. 
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A. Preconditions for EU Legislative Action 
The European Union does not have its own autonomous source of legislative authority. 
Instead, the Union derives its competence to adopt legal acts through conferral of powers from the 
Member States. According to the “principle of conferral,” the EU may act only within the limits 
of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (Article 5(2) TFEU). 
The TFEU defines the Union’s competence in several policy areas, including environmental and 
energy policy, as well as the functioning of the internal market.29 A provision in the TFEU that 
establishes the Union´s competence to adopt binding measures, such as directives and regulations, 
within a certain policy area and also defines how such measures are to be decided is referred to as 
a “legal basis:” it provides the basis for legal action by the Union. As discussed below, the 
preconditions for adopting legal acts—including the voting rules—differ among policy areas, as 
reflected in legal bases; preconditions may also differ among specific measures within an area, 
such as environmental policy.  
In addition to the principle of conferral, the EU’s ability to legislate is also defined by 
certain other principles, primarily those of subsidiarity and proportionality. The function of the 
subsidiarity principle is to ensure that decisions are taken as closely to the citizen as possible; the 
EU does not take action unless it is more efficient than action at the national, regional or local 
level. The subsidiarity principle therefor sets limits as to when the Union may use its competence 
in areas, such as environmental and energy policy, where it shares legislative power with the 
Member States (see further Section 3.2). Two conditions must be met for the Union to legislate in 
such areas: that the objectives of a proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, and that these objectives can, because of their scale and effects, be better achieved at Union 
level (Article 5.3 TEU). Subsidiarity is seldom an obstacle to EU action in the field of environment: 
the scope for benefits from concerted EU action is clear, either because of the transboundary nature 
of the problem or because of the negative effects for the internal market of measures taken 
unilaterally by individual Member States.30 This reasoning is particularly pertinent with respect to 
emissions abatement measures, such as those associated with the EU ETS, due to both the 
genuinely global nature of the climate problem and the likely negative effects on relative 
competitiveness associated with taking unilateral measures in this area.  
Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of EU measures may not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the treaties, including environmental 
                                                 
29 For an in-depth discussion, see K. LENAERTS & P. VAN NUFFEL, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 112–13 (2013). 
30 D. LANGLET & S. MAHMOUDI, EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW (2016) 47. 
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protection (Article 5.4 TEU). That the introduction of an auction reserve price would violate the 
proportionality principle is highly unlikely, since the purpose would merely be to render an already 
existing—and proportional—EU mechanism effective and more consistent with the intentions 
behind its adoption (i.e., to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and 
economically efficient manner). 
B. EU Legislation, Procedures, and Leeway for Member State Action  
As mentioned above, all EU legislative power has been conferred from the Member States. 
The extent of conferral varies among policy areas. In a few areas, the EU has exclusive competence, 
meaning that only the Union may adopt legally binding acts, unless the Member States have been 
empowered by the Union to adopt such acts for the implementation of EU law (Article 2 (1) 
TFEU).31 Environmental and energy policies, however, fall into an area of shared competence, in 
which both the Union and the Member States may adopt legally binding acts. However, the 
Member States may exercise their competence only as long as and to the extent that the Union has 
not exercised its competence (Article 2 (2) TFEU). As soon as the Union has legislated in an area 
subject to shared competence, the extent to which individual Member States may still act in that 
area is determined by the legal basis used for the EU legislation, as well as by the more precise 
contents of the pertinent EU acts.  
The legal basis determines not only the competence but also the decision-making procedure 
for EU legislation. The ordinary legislative procedure requires a qualified majority in the Council, 
which means 55% (currently 16 of 28) of Member States must vote in favor, and the supporting 
Member States must represent at least 65% of the total EU population. Previously known as 
codecision, ordinary legislative procedure gives the same weight to the European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union in offering amendments and approval. The codecision 
procedure was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), and with the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the 
renamed ordinary legislative procedure became the standard procedure for EU decision making.  
However, in certain matters deemed to be sensitive, a special legislative procedure applies, 
in which the Council acts unanimously after merely consulting the European Parliament (which is 
a colegislator under the ordinary legislative procedure), the Economic and Social Committee, and 
the Committee of the Regions. After consulting these other bodies, the Council may make the 
ordinary legislative procedure applicable also to measures that would otherwise require unanimity. 
However, such a decision itself requires unanimity. 
                                                 
31 Exclusive competence applies inter alia with respect to the common commercial policy (CCP) — that is, the 
regulation of trade with third countries — and the conservation of marine biological resources under the common 
fisheries policy (Article 3 TFEU), neither of which have any direct link to the EU ETS. 
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The trigger for the special procedure, and whether it might apply to an auction reserve 
price, is the heart of our analysis. The next sections explain the legal bases for the relevant areas 
of environmental and energy policy, particularly with respect to implications for voting rules and 
the division of competence between the Union and the individual Member States. 
C. Environmental and Energy Policy Bases 
Article 191 TFEU sets out the objectives to the pursuit of which EU environmental policy 
is to “contribute”—in other words, for what aims the EU can legislate under its environmental 
policy. These objectives include “preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment” and “promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.”  
The ordinary legislative procedure is generally applicable for actions aimed at achieving 
the Union’s environmental policy objectives (Article 192 (1) TFEU). However, the special 
legislative procedure must be used in certain cases. These cases include, as far as is relevant here, 
the adoption of “provisions primarily of a fiscal nature” (Article 192 (2) (a) TFEU) and “measures 
significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the general 
structure of its energy supply” (Article 192 (2) (c) TFEU). The meanings of these conditions—and 
their implications for the introduction of an auction reserve price—are examined in Section 4. 
In EU climate policy, choice of the decision-making procedure has played an important 
role in the past. In the 1990s, the Commission proposed an EU-wide carbon and energy tax, 
pursuing the special procedure and unanimity requirement that applies to taxes.32 After the Council 
failed to reach unanimity for adopting the proposal, the Commission turned to the ETS as a market-
based regulatory measure capable of being adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure. As 
such, the legal act setting up the EU ETS (“EU ETS Directive”) was adopted in 2003,33 using the 
legal basis for environmental policy (then Article 175(1) EC, now Article 192 TFEU).  
The current legal situation differs somewhat from that in 2003 because of the introduction 
in 2009, of a distinct legal basis for energy policy in Article 194 TFEU. Energy now has a separate 
title with the aim to “(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy 
supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new 
                                                 
32 Referring to the earlier EEC Treaty of the time (Maastricht consolidated version), the proposal cites as a basis not 
only Article 130(S), the precursor of the current Article 192, but also Article 99, which lays out the special procedure 
for provisions regarding the harmonization of indirect taxes. European Commission, Directive Introducing a Tax on 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, COM(92) 226. 
33 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 Establishing a Scheme 
for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading Within the Community and Amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32. 
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and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks” (Article 
194 (1)). The preamble to this section states that this aim is to be met “with regard for the need to 
preserve and improve the environment.” This qualification reflects the integration principle, 
according to which “environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development” (Art 11 TFEU).  
Regarding the legislative procedure, Article 194 TFEU largely echoes the language of 
Article 192: while the ordinary legislative procedure is the standard procedure for adopting legal 
acts within this policy area, the special legislative procedure applies to measures “primarily of a 
fiscal nature” (Article 194 (3)). Article 194 further establishes that measures adopted on this legal 
basis “shall not affect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy 
resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy 
supply”—by any procedure (Article 194 (2)). This provision, which shall be “without prejudice to 
Article 192(2)(c)”—which allows “measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice 
between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply” to proceed as part 
of EU environmental policy under the special procedure with unanimity in the Council—has 
generated considerable uncertainty as to the actual scope of the Union’s competence in this area.34 
Although there are great overlaps between energy and climate policy,35 the EU ETS 
Directive stipulates that the overall aim is “to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in 
a cost-effective and economically efficient manner,” and the Directive “provides for the reductions 
of greenhouse gas emissions to be increased so as to contribute to the levels of reductions that are 
considered scientifically necessary to avoid dangerous climate change” (Article 1). Hence the EU 
ETS Directive was based on the environmental basis, and on 192(1), not 192(2).36 This supports 
that view that the EU ETS directive is essentially about environmental protection. It is also 
noteworthy that the EU ETS covers significant volumes of CO2 that are production related, 
including from the iron, steel and cement industries, rather than being the result of energy 
generating activities, thus indicating that it is not primarily an energy-related measure. Further 
strengthening this conclusion is the fact that the EU ETS Directive has been amended several times 
                                                 
34 On this issue, see further A. Johnston & E. van der Marel, Ad Lucem? Interpreting the New EU Energy 
Provision, and in Particular the Meaning of Article 194(2) TFEU 22 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 181 (2013).  
35 See W. Frenz & A.M. Kane, Die neue europäische Energiepolitik, 32 NATUR UND RECHT 464, 469 (2010). 
36 See also R. Ismer & M. Haussner, Inclusion of Consumption into the EU ETS: The Legal Basis Under European 
Union Law, 25 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 69, 73 (2016); F. Kirchhof & I. Kemmer, 
Einstimmigkeitserfordernis im Rat bei der Beschlussfassung über eine europäische Richtlinie zum Handel mit 
Treibhausgasemissionsberechtigungen 11 EUROPÄISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERRECHT 217 (2003); C. Seiler, 
Kompetenz- und verfahrensrechtliche Maßstäbe europäischer Umweltabgaben 45 EUROPARECHT 67 (2010). 
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after the introduction of a separate legal basis for energy policy in 2009, inter alia to introduce a 
market stability reserve, without exception using the original environmental policy basis that is 
now found in Article 192 (1).37 Because an auction reserve price, irrespective of its exact legal 
format, would functionally be a fully integrated part of the EU ETS, there is no reason to believe 
that such a decision should have a different legal basis. 
III. THE LEGAL SCOPE FOR INTRODUCING AN AUCTION RESERVE PRICE  
Regarding the potential introduction of an auction reserve price in the EU ETS, the key 
questions for the decision-making procedure are whether such a measure would be deemed as 
“primarily of a fiscal nature” (Articles 192 (2) (a) and 194 TFEU) or “significantly affecting a 
Member State's choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy 
supply” (Article 192 (2) (c) TFEU). We address each of these in turn. 
A. Interpreting “Primarily of a Fiscal Nature” 
To determine whether an auction reserve price mechanism would qualify as a measure that 
is primarily of a fiscal nature, we have to examine the meaning of “fiscal nature” and “primarily” 
in this context.  
Cases clarifying the meaning of the “primarily of a fiscal nature” provision contained in 
Articles 192(2)(a) and 194(3) TFEU are rare. To our knowledge, no legislative acts have been 
passed under these legal bases requiring unanimity voting. Environmental tax measures are 
believed to require unanimity in the Council;38 one example is the current harmonized energy 
taxation framework (Directive 2003/96/EC), which uses another legal basis that also requires 
unanimity (Article 113 TFEU on harmonization of taxes to ensure functioning of the internal 
market). In the event of a challenge referring to the legal basis of a measure, the Court will consider 
the content and the aim of the proposed measure to discern whether to use treaty provisions 
requiring the ordinary or the special legislative procedure.39  
                                                 
37 These amendments include Regulation (EU) No 421/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014 Amending Directive 2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance 
Trading Within the Community, in View of the Implementation by 2020 of an International Agreement Applying a 
Single Global Market-Based Measure to International Aviation Emissions [2014] OJ L 129/1; and Decision (EU) 
2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 Concerning the Establishment and 
Operation of a Market Stability Reserve for the Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme and Amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC [2015] OJ L 264/1. 
38 Advocate General Léger on C-36/98 Spain v. Council. 
39 C-36/98 Spain v. Council. 
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All language versions of the EU treaties are equally authentic. This complicates the 
interpretation of the meaning of “fiscal measure,” because the legal traditions and tax laws in the 
respective Member States differ, including relevant terminology. Approaching the term “fiscal 
measure” from the perspective of national tax law is therefore often futile. In EU law, there is no 
common definition of the term “tax”; rather, it is used as a functional concept.40 The lowest 
common denominator among scholars is that taxes are “compulsory and unrequited payments to 
the general government” with the general aim to raise revenues.41 Taxes can be contrasted with 
charges or “fees,” which may be compulsory but are requited payments for services rendered or 
values received in proportion with the costs incurred.42 Marketable emissions permits, meanwhile, 
have been consistently viewed as non-tax measures in EU legal doctrine and case law, as 
elaborated further below.  
Under a narrow interpretation of the wording “of a fiscal nature,” only taxes would be 
included in this category, not fees.43 For example, indirect taxes like value-added taxes and excise 
duties are unquestionably used for raising revenue and their harmonization explicitly requires the 
special procedure (Article 113 TFEU). Environmental charges, like roadway tolls, however, are 
not generally considered to trigger the higher procedural threshold; EU transport law on the 
internalization of the external costs of road transport was adopted under standard procedure.44  
Proponents of a narrow interpretation refer to the role of Articles 192(2) and 194(3) TFEU, 
which constitute a derogation to the ordinary legislative procedure,45 and argue that this narrow 
interpretation safeguards the effet utile (Article 19 TEU) of EU law.46 This interpretation matters 
because an auction reserve price mechanism could be considered a fee rather than a tax under the 
foregoing definitions, given that EU ETS market participants obtain tradable allowances in return 
for their payments, making it a “requited” payment. If the wording “of a fiscal nature” in Articles 
192(2) and 194(3) TFEU is interpreted to include only taxes, allowances may thus be excluded by 
virtue of being considered more akin to fees than taxes. 
And indeed, as some authors have pointed out, an expansive interpretation that includes 
fees would result in inconsistencies between the legal treatment of environmental fees and fees in 
                                                 
40 See WEISHAAR, supra note 10, at 37. 
41 ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REVENUE STATISTICS 1965–2017 INTERPRETATIVE GUIDE (2018), Annex A: 
The OECD Classification of Taxes and Interpretative Guide, A.2.1, https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/oecd-
classification-taxes-interpretative-guide.pdf. 
42 See WEISHAAR, supra note 10, at 37 
43 Id. at 40. 
44 Directive 2011/76/EU of 27 September 2011 on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain 
infrastructures. 
45 Calliess & Ruffert (2011), EGV/EUV Rn 28-32.  
46 Id. 
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other policy areas: environmental fees would then require unanimity, whereas fees in other areas 
are commonly adopted on the basis of qualified majority voting.47 Others have drawn attention to 
the fact that fees are less intrusive on Member State sovereignty than tax measures, again justifying 
excluding fees from the stricter voting requirements under Articles 192(2)(a) and 194(3) TFEU.48 
As long as an auction reserve price mechanism is considered a fee, the interpretation favored by 
these authors would have it fall outside the scope of measures “of a fiscal nature.”  
Still, there are voices in the literature that have supported a broader interpretation of 
Articles 192(2) and 194(3) TFEU to include both taxes and fees within the notion of measures “of 
a fiscal nature.” For Freytag, the object and purpose of the provision is to safeguard the financial 
autonomy of Member States, and as a consequence, the budgetary impact of the measure has to be 
the decisive yardstick; a differentiation between different types of fiscal measures is therefore not 
helpful, according to Freytag.49 This line of reasoning links to the second conceptual element of 
Articles 192(2)(a) and 194(3) TFEU, discussed in the next paragraph. 
Even if an auction reserve price mechanism were considered a tax (or, alternatively, a fee 
but subject to a broad interpretation of the wording “of a fiscal nature” that includes requited fees), 
it would additionally have to satisfy the further qualification of being “primarily” of a fiscal nature. 
This wording suggests that the fiscal aspect of the measure has to be its central element.50 In the 
literature, it is therefore sometimes argued that the analysis should center on the question of what 
revenue implications a measure has and whether Member State sovereignty over budgets and 
raising revenues is safeguarded.51 The objective of an auction reserve price mechanism is not to 
increase or reduce revenue, but to create a more predictable price signal and therefore strengthen 
achievement of an environmental objective; moreover, it would have no predictable bearing on the 
revenue volumes generated through allowance auctions, as higher prices at auction could also 
result in more unsold allowances, and it would not influence how Member States use auction 
revenue. Based on those arguments, one could argue that an auction reserve price mechanism, even 
if it were considered to be of a fiscal nature, is not “primarily” so.  
Still, some uncertainty remains, as the “primarily” threshold is not clearly defined. Setting 
a high bar for the “primarily” requirement could undermine the effectiveness of Articles 192(2) 
and 194(3) TFEU, allowing a legislator to circumvent the provision by reducing the importance of 
the fiscal element (such as by making it revenue neutral). On the other hand, a low bar for 
                                                 
47 C. Mueller, 1994, p. 83. 
48 A. Epiney, 1997, p. 57. 
49 GEORG FREYTAG, EUROPARECHTLICHE ANFORDERUNGEN AN UMWELTABGABEN (2001). 
50 See WEISHAAR, supra note 10, at 39. 
51 See P. KREIBOHM, DER BEGRIFF DER STEUER IM EUROPAEISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT (2003). 
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“primarily” coupled with a broad interpretation of “fiscal nature” could lead to an equally 
nonsensical outcome that any mechanism that incidentally raises revenues would require a special 
procedure. Such a broad interpretation of Articles 192(2)(a) and 194(3) TFEU then runs counter 
to their function as a derogation to the ordinary legislative procedure—that is, being the exception, 
not the rule.52 
Overall, considerable uncertainty remains about the exact definition of “primarily of a 
fiscal nature.” However, both the passage of the ETS Directive under Article 192(1) legal basis 
and subsequent jurisprudence indicate that auctioned emissions allowances do not fall into this 
territory. The alleged “fiscal nature” of the EU ETS itself has been subject to analysis by the CJEU 
in the context of an EU measure including international aviation in the trading scheme.53 Initially, 
Advocate General Kokott, in her nonbinding opinion, reasoned that “it would be unusual, to put it 
mildly, to describe as a charge or tax the purchase price paid for an emission allowance, which is 
based on supply and demand according to free market forces, notwithstanding the fact that the 
Member States do have a certain discretion regarding the use to be made of revenues generated 
(Article 3d(4) of Directive 2003/87)”54 and that “the EU emissions trading scheme cannot be 
considered a tax for the same reasons as it is not to be classed as a charge.”55 The Court confirmed 
this in its judgment, stating that “the scheme introduced by the ETS Directive is unlike a duty, tax, 
fee or charge on fuel consumption”56 and, further, that it “cannot be asserted that Directive 
2008/101 involves a form of obligatory levy in favour of the public authorities that might be 
regarded as constituting a customs duty, tax, fee or charge.”57 It went on to conclude that the 
trading scheme “by reason of its particular features, constitutes a market-based measure and not a 
duty, tax, fee or charge on the fuel load.”58  
In addition, it is worth recalling that EU ETS allowances are classified as financial 
instruments under the amended Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II, Annex I, 
section C (11)) as of 2018.59 Emissions allowances are hence subject to financial market 
legislation, and consequently buyers pay a certain price and obtain title, which can be transferred 
                                                 
52 Following FREYTAG, supra note 49, at 80ff. 
53 Directive 2008/101. 
54 C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:637 at 216. 
55 Id. at 227. 
56 Id. at 143. 
57 Id. at 145. 
58 Id. at 147. 
59 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on Markets in Financial 
Instruments and Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, 349–496. 
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afterwards to other market participants.60 Emissions allowances are marketable and tradable, 
further supporting the view that the EU ETS system cannot be classified as a tax or a fee. 
The decisive question, then, is whether the establishment of a reserve price for auctioned 
allowances could conceivably pull this nonfiscal measure into “fiscal” territory. Reasonable 
interpretations of EU law make such an outcome far-fetched.  
The inclusion of an auction reserve price would form an intrinsic part of the EU ETS and 
hence cannot be viewed as a separate measure, but as one inseparably linked—and thus akin in 
nature—to the underlying nonfiscal instrument.61 Its clear aim would be to stabilize the EU ETS 
and render it more effective toward its purpose of cost-effectively reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and combating climate change. One cannot argue that the primary aim is to raise 
revenues—also because that effect is not assured. If fewer allowances are sold, albeit at a higher 
price, it is not clear whether the auction proceeds will rise or fall. Indeed, the price and revenue 
effects of an auction reserve price would be functionally similar to those that the MSR is intended 
to produce. In any case, over 80% of auction revenues have been earmarked toward climate and 
energy purposes,62 further limiting the impact on Member State fiscal policy budgets, and the 
auction reserve price would not necessarily alter or influence that revenue allocation. The larger 
revenue consequences for Member States from allowance auctioning come from the transition to 
full auctioning over time, which was provided for in the EU ETS Directive under standard 
procedure. 
Most importantly, an auction reserve price in the EU ETS cannot be considered tantamount 
to a tax, since it does not lead to a mandatory levy.63 Market participants are not required to 
purchase allowances at auction and have robust secondary markets as a source of supply. Nor does 
an auction reserve price fix the price, unlike a tax or fee; the price will still be determined by supply 
and demand forces in the market. That price may be higher than the reserve price if expectations 
of future allowance value are strong, and the market price may also fall below the reserve price if 
supplies in secondary markets are sufficient relative to demand. To the extent that market 
participants go to the auction, they purchase a financial asset with a value proportionate to the cost. 
These payments cannot be considered unrequited. 
                                                 
60 M. WEMAËRE & P. BERNHEIM, LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING A “CARBON PRICE CORRIDOR” 
WITHIN THE EU ETS (2016).  
61 See WEISHAAR, supra note 10, at 32-45. A similar line of argumentation is by Ismer & Haussner, discussing the 
inclusion of consumption into the EU ETS. See Ismer & Haussner, supra note 36. 
62 XAVIER LE DEN, EDMUND BEAVOR, SAMY PORTERON, & ADRIANA ILISESCU, ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF AUCTION 
REVENUES BY THE MEMBER STATES: FINAL REPORT (2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/ets/auctioning/docs/auction_revenues_report_2017_en.pdf. 
63 See WEMAËRE & BERNHEIM, supra note 60, at 3. 
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B. Interpreting “Measures Significantly Affecting a Member State’s Choice between Different 
Energy Sources and the General Structure of its Energy Supply” 
Article 192(2)(c) TFEU also requires the special legislative procedure and unanimity for 
“measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and 
the general structure of its energy supply.” The scope of this provision and what exactly can be 
considered to have a “significant effect” has been subject to discussion.  
Considering the language in the legal basis for energy regulation, Rusche argues that a 
narrow interpretation of “affecting a Member State’s choice” is necessary to preserve the effet utile 
of Article 194(1) TFEU. Following this argument, “the result would be that the choice of the 
Member State is only affected where secondary legislation outlaws the use of a certain energy 
source.”64 As the language in Article 192(2)(c) is even stronger—“significantly affecting a 
Member State’s choice—the application should arguably be at least as narrow in the case of 
environmental regulation.  
This interpretation is also supported by a recent judgment by the CJEU regarding the MSR. 
Poland argued that the reform infringed on Article 192(2)(c).65 With 83% of its electricity from 
coal and lignite, Poland asserted that the price of allowances, by influencing the choice of 
production technology for future investments, has an impact on the development of the national 
electricity production structure and therefore interferes with its energy security. The Court 
dismissed the action, stressing among other things that  
a broad interpretation of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU 
would risk having the effect of making recourse to the special legislative procedure, 
which the Treaty FEU intended as an exception, into the general rule. That 
conclusion is irreconcilable with the Court’s case-law, according to which 
provisions that are exceptions to principles must be interpreted strictly.66  
As another example, the Renewable Energy Directive established mandatory national targets for 
the overall share of renewable energy in a Member State’s energy mix (e.g., for Belgium, from a 
2.2% level in 2005 to 13% in 2020) and requires the establishment of national action plans to reach 
these targets. One would thus reasonably expect this Directive to have a significant impact on the 
Member States’ energy choices;67 however, it was passed without question as an environmental 
                                                 
64 TIM MAXIAN RUSCHE, EU RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY LAW AND POLICY: FROM NATIONAL TARGETS TO A COMMON 
MARKET 213 (2015). 
65 C-5/16 - Poland v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2018:483 at 24.  
66 Id. at 44–45 and, by analogy, judgment of 10 June 2010, Bruno and Others, C‑395/08 and C‑396/08, 
EU:C:2010:329, paragraph 35 and the case law cited. 
67 See, for a more detailed discussion, M. Peeters, Governing Towards Renewable Energy in the EU: Competences, 
Instruments and Procedures, 24 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 39 (2014); K. Verhaegen, L. Meeus, B. Delvaux, 
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regulation based on Article 192(1), not based on Article 192(2) TFEU—nor as an energy 
regulation based on Article 194, for that matter.68  
A similar argumentation can be observed regarding the ETS Directive. Economically, one 
might argue that the EU ETS could have had a significant impact on the Member States’ energy 
supply structure, but the environmental legal basis was not questioned. Consequently, it seems 
unlikely that amendments to the EU ETS (including the introduction of an auction reserve price) 
would require a different legal basis than the ETS itself. However, this argumentation is not 
completely convincing, as it would arguably open the way for the European Commission to first 
introduce some kind of “light” regulation without any “significant” impacts and then introduce 
stronger impacts through the back door by amending the said legislation afterward. This idea is 
also confirmed in the MSR judgment, which states that “the legal basis for a measure must be 
determined having regard to its own aim and content and not to the legal basis used for the adoption 
of other EU measures that might, in certain cases, display similar characteristics.”69 
One might consider the potential impact of the EU ETS Reserve Price Mechanism on the 
Member State’s choice between different energy sources, in particular to see if it could be 
perceived as tantamount to a ban on a particular source. In this regard, as pointed out in Wemaëre 
and Bernheim’s legal analysis of a floor price, a Member State could argue that “if the floor price 
is higher than the marginal abatement costs in its energy sector, or in several energy intensive 
industry sectors,” such an effect could clearly be reached. To circumvent such an effect, the authors 
suggest that  
it seems reasonable to use the « switch price » from coal to gas (estimated at 30€/ton 
of CO2 eq.) as a relevant indicator for identifying the possible impacts of the floor 
price on Member States’ choices. With a floor price set at 25€/EUAs as one of the 
option proposed by the French Government, one Member State could hardly argue 
that it could be affected.70 
This strategy notwithstanding, we can hardly expect the legal trigger for the Commission 
to exercise its powers to depend on market circumstances, which in turn depend on a variety of 
factors (in the above example, including not only allowance prices but also fuel prices for coal and 
                                                 
& R. Belmans, Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy Sources: What Target Are We Aiming For? 35 
ENERGY POL’Y 5576 (2007). 
68 One might also wonder why the Renewable Energy Directive is based on environmental competence at all, given 
the fact that Article 194 is supposed to promote the development of renewable energy. See also K. TALUS, EU 
ENERGY LAW AND POLICY: A CRITICAL ACCOUNT 180 (2013); R. Leal-Arcas & A. Filis, Conceptualizing Energy 
Security Through an EU Constitutional Perspective 36 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1225, 1246 (2013). 
69 ECLI:EU:C:2018:483 at 49. 
70 See WEMAËRE & BERNHEIM, supra note 60, at 4. 
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natural gas). The argument that the effect on the general structure of Member States’ energy supply 
will depend on the allowance price level used is an economic one, but such an economic 
benchmark cannot be used as a legal reasoning for or against unanimity.71 This finding is also 
supported by the Courts MSR judgment, stating:  
Given that, in order to know the real and specific effects of a legislative measure, 
it is necessary to analyse those effects after its entry into force, the legislature’s 
choice would have to be based on assumptions as to the likely impact of that 
measure, which, by their nature, are speculative and are in no way objective factors 
amenable to judicial review. . . . Consequently, it must be found that the assessment 
of the effect of an EU measure on a Member State’s energy policy is not a factor 
that must be assessed in addition to the aim and content of that act, or by derogation 
therefrom.72  
The Court further stressed that “not only the aim, but also the content of the adopted measure are 
essential factors when reviewing the merits of the legal basis of that act.”73 
In addition, the effect would need to be “significant” in order to trigger Article 192(2)(c) 
TFEU. Even though the word “significant” seems to be a rather important qualifier in determining 
the environmental and energy competences, the notion has received little attention to date. The 
introduction of the environmental title in the Single European Act did not yet refer to the 
“significant” effect, as unanimity was required for all actions related to the environment. The 1992 
Maastricht Treaty74 introduced qualified majority voting in environmental matters in Article 130r 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty)75 as a general rule, even though 
several issues remained subject to unanimity under EC Treaty Article 130s. The term 
“significance” was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, although subsequently, it has not been 
discussed in greater detail in the 2004 and 2007 Intergovernmental Conferences nor in the Draft 
Constitution.76  
To date, the different wording in the titles has not received much attention, neither from 
legal scholarship nor from the Court.77 Calliess suggests that this wording narrows the application 
                                                 
71 As used in id. at 4. 
72 ECLI:EU:C:2018:483 at 41f.  
73 Id. at 47. 
74 Treaty on European Union, [1992] OJ C191/1. 
75 EC Treaty, [1992], OJ C224/1. 
76 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, [2004] OJ C169/1, art. III-234.2(c). 
77 The few instances where the Court has dealt with “significance” in the area of European environmental law are 
listed in N. DE SADELEER, EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE INTERNAL MARKET 51 (2014). Accordingly, they relate 
to “a significant deterioration in the environment over a protracted period without any action being taken by the 
competent authorities” (ECJ, Case C-365/97 Commission v. Italy [1999] ECR I-7773 at 68; Case C-420/02 
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of Article 192(2)(c) TFEU to measures that “substantially and intentionally alter the very 
foundations of the energy system.”78  
Regarding the setting of an auction reserve price, such an interpretation means that a price 
would need to be set in such a way that it would not have a “significant” effect on the Member 
States’ general supply structure. The fact that the ETS Directive itself did not trigger this threshold 
as it was adopted under Article 192(1)—with expected allowance prices of €30/ton of CO2—is 
thus again an indicator that amendments to the Directive do not lead to a significant effect on the 
Member States’ general supply structure. Further, the Court specifies that “[i]t follows that point 
(c) of the first subparagraph of Article 192(2) TFEU can form the legal basis of an EU measure 
only if it follows from the aim and content of that measure that the primary outcome sought by 
that measure is significantly to affect a Member State’s choice between different energy sources 
and the general structure of the energy supply of that Member State.”79  
In the case at hand, the Court further reasoned that the MSR  
was designed as a tool seeking, in the first place, to remedy existing imbalances 
and, in the second place, to render the ETS more resistant to any future event on a 
sufficiently large scale as to disturb seriously the balance between the supply and 
demand of allowances. In essence, it is a one-off intervention on the part of the 
legislature for the purpose of correcting a structural weakness of the ETS that could 
prevent the scheme from fulfilling its function of encouraging investment with a 
view to reducing carbon dioxide emissions in a cost-effective manner and being a 
driver of low-carbon innovation contributing to the fight against climate change,80  
thereby following the Advocate General observing that “the MSR is designed merely as a 
supplement or a correction of the ETS.”81  
                                                 
Commission v. Greece [2004] ECR I-11175 at 22; Case C-297/08 Commission v. Italy [2010] EHR I-1749 at 101. 
Case C-37/09 Commission v. Portugal [2010] ECR I-76 at 38); to “the significant environmental effects caused by the 
incorrect implementation of the Urban Waste water Directive must be substantiated by a certain amount of evidence” 
(Case C-508/03 Commission v. UK [2006] ECR I-4475 at 36; Case C-300/07 Commission v. UK [2009] ECR I-214 
at 46); and to the Urban Waste Water Directive and “significant adverse effects on flora or fauna” (Case C-280/02 
Commission v. France [2004] ECR I-8573 at 22 & 23; Case C-390/07 Commission v. UK [2009] ECR I-214 at 36). 
78 Christian Calliess, Art. 192 AEUV, in EUV/AEUV: DAS VERFASSUNGSRECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION MIT 
EUROPÄISCHER GRUNDRECHTECHARTA. KOMMENTAR (Christian Calliess & Matthias Ruffert eds., 5th ed. 2016), 
Margin No. 32, with further references. 
79 ECLI:EU:C:2018:483 at 46. 
80 Id. at 61. 
81 Id. at 69. 
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The Court further pointed out that the MSR “does not intervene directly to set the price of 
allowances, the latter being determined exclusively by market forces,”82 and explicitly recognized 
that the MSR “logically involves an increase in the price of allowances in the future.”83 Since an 
auction reserve price would have much the same proposed effect on the ETS as intended by the 
MSR—supporting but not forming prices and complementing the existing system—one can expect 
a similar rebuttal to a potential legal challenge. 
C. Experience with Provisions already in the EU ETS Directive and Auctioning Regulation 
Some forms of price controls are already included in the EU ETS Directive, even if the 
system overall follows a quantity-based approach.84 The provisions focus on the possibility of 
excessively high prices. In 2009, a new Article 29(a) on “Measures in the event of excessive price 
fluctuations” was introduced into the ETS Directive (Directive 2009/29/EC). It provides for the 
possibility of convening a meeting of the Climate Change Committee, in which all Member States 
are represented, in the event that for “more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is 
more than three times the average price of allowances during the two preceding years on the 
European carbon market.”85 Further, if “the price evolution . . . does not correspond to changing 
market fundamentals,” the Commission may permit Member States to auction some additional 
allowances that might otherwise be reserved, either by bringing forward part of the quantity to be 
auctioned in the future or by including up to 25% of the remaining allowances in the new entrants 
reserve. 
The Directive thus foresees interventions in the case of a price spike that lasts more than 
half a year. The response to bring forward the auctioning of allowances (a) or auctioning even 
more allowances (b) serves to expand supply and reduce the price of allowances. Notably, these 
are quantity-based mechanisms that arguably may have paved the way for the changes to 
incorporate the MSR as a means to adjust supply for both unusually low and high price outcomes. 
The explanatory memorandum for the proposal of the original ETS Directive underscores 
the greater attention paid to price-spike concerns: “once Member States have taken their decisions 
on initial allocation for the initial three-year or subsequent five-year periods, unforeseen 
circumstances might arise that would lead to sudden increases in the price of allowances.”86 The 
                                                 
82 Id. at 63. 
83 Id. at 67. 
84 See WEMAËRE & BERNHEIM, supra note 60, at 3. 
85 Art. 29a (1). 
86 Proposal for a Directive Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the 
Community and Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, COM(2001) 581- COD 2001/0245, OJ C 75E , 26.3.2002, 
33–44, Explanatory memorandum. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52001PC0581:EN:HTML. 
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European Commission counters the concern by referring to other ETS systems and by stating that 
“such price spikes have not proven to be problematic . . . elsewhere in the world”87 and that it is 
key that a liquid market is established with a variety of market players. Low-price outcomes were 
not mentioned in the Commission’s memorandum. 
The Auctioning Regulation itself provides for a kind of reserve price to prohibit sudden 
and excessive price drops in the event of a deficient auction, resulting in the cancellation of the 
auction. It is a secret minimum clearing price of an auction, set on the basis of the going market 
price for emissions allowances before the auction:88 in case the “auction clearing price is 
significantly under the price on the secondary market prevailing during and immediately before 
the bidding window when taking into account the short term volatility of the price of allowances 
over a defined period preceding the auction.”89 However, this volatility break is not designed to 
function as a standard reserve price, as the rule does not foresee any measures in case of an 
extreme, persistent decrease in prices. Still, its presence signals a certain tolerance on the part of 
Member States of a minimum price in the auction process.  
Finally, the recent experience with the establishment of the MSR holds relevant lessons for 
an auction reserve price. First of all, the motivation of the MSR has been to support the allowance 
price. Although an auction reserve price would do this directly, the MSR uses quantity measures 
to adjust allowances in circulation. It withholds allowances from auction when the number of 
allowances in circulation exceed an upper threshold, 833 megatons (Mt), and it reintroduces 
allowances when that number falls below a minimum value, 400 Mt.  
A new Directive reforms the EU ETS for Phase 4, covering the years 2021–2030.90 The 
reform has three provisions for increasing stringency: 
• a strengthening of the annual cap reduction factor (called the linear reduction factor, LRF) 
from 1.74% to 2.2% per year; 
• increasing the feed-in rate of allowances to the MSR during the period 2019–2024; 
• introduction of an option for Member States to voluntarily cancel allowances as a result of 
plant or utility closures. 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 See European Commission, supra note 5. 
89 See also WEMAËRE & BERNHEIM, supra note 60, at 3. 
90 Directive 2018/410 of 14 March 2018 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission 
reductions and low-carbon investments, and Decision (EU) 2015/1814. 
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The expectations for the proposed reform by the Commission is to stabilize and increase 
the EUA price to an average of €25/ton CO2 in Phase 4.91 These official projections offer an 
indication of allowance price levels that both are acceptable politically and legally do not raise 
issues requiring a special procedure. 
D. Legal Options for Introducing an Auction Reserve Price in the EU ETS 
According to our preceding analysis, an auction reserve price within reasonable bounds 
should not require the special procedure for the same reason the ETS Directive and recent 
amendments did not require special procedure. Certainly, an auction reserve price in the range of 
official projections of allowance prices (e.g., €30/ton, used as an average projection when the 
Directive was adopted) could not be deemed to “significantly affect a Member State’s choice 
between energy sources.” And certainly, an auction reserve price in the range of the prices hoped 
to be induced by the quantitative intervention mechanisms of the Market Stability Reserve (e.g., 
€25/ton on average between 2021 and 2030)92 could not be deemed to be “primarily of a fiscal 
nature,” since it would have no greater revenue implications than those projected for that 
amendment, which was promulgated under the ordinary procedure. Thus, we find no reason for a 
reasonable auction reserve price to require unanimity or have any legal basis other than Article 
192(1), given its aim of incrementally strengthening the EU ETS to better meet its environmental 
objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively.  
The inclusion of an auction reserve price mechanism can therefore be adopted through one 
of three procedures: (1) an amendment of the EU ETS Directive directly; (2) an amendment of the 
Auctioning Regulation, which is based on the EU ETS Directive; or (3) a Decision akin to the 
Decision implementing the MSR.  
The first option, amending the ETS Directive, could be done through Article 192(1) TFEU, 
usually through passage of a new directive that replaces, expands, or modifies the existing legal 
framework. This would occur through the ordinary legislative procedure (Articles 289, 294 TFEU) 
and would involve joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council based on a proposal 
from the Commission. An established process, the ordinary legislative procedure offers 
transparency and a high level of legal robustness, but it can also be circuitous and protracted.  
The second option would rely on Article 10(4) of the ETS Directive, which provides the 
legal basis for the adoption of a Commission Regulation “on timing, administration and other 
                                                 
91 See European Commission, supra note 28, at 27, which states, “The total amount of allowances available to be 
handed out for free to industry for the period under assessment (2021 to 2030) is in the order of 6.3 billion allowances. 
The value of these allowances depends on the market price at the time and could be in the order of €160 billion.” 
92 Id. 
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aspects of auctioning to ensure that it is conducted in an open, transparent, harmonized and non-
discriminatory manner,” a legal basis that resulted in the adoption of the Auctioning Regulation. 
A reserve price could hence be introduced through an amendment of the Auctioning Regulation 
under the legal basis for its adoption, namely Article 10(4) of the ETS Directive, although this 
possibility may require arguing the reserve price is more a technical aspect of auctioning than a 
significant change in the structure of the ETS.  
Legally, it might be possible to introduce a reserve price mechanism by amending the 
Auctioning Regulation through the examination procedure established by Regulation 182/2011 
(“the Comitology Regulation”).93 Under this procedure, the decision could be taken by a qualified 
majority within the Climate Change Committee according to Article 192(1) TFEU (unless the 
amendment relates to instances that require unanimity under Article 192(2)).94 This could facilitate 
a more efficient process than the ordinary legislative procedure, provided that the proposed 
amendment is not contentious. Member States retain the possibility of objecting or even litigating 
the scope for this under the Comitology Regulation 182/2011. In practice, and also politically, it 
may therefore be preferable to have the discussion more visibly and to introduce such a reserve 
price via an amendment of the ETS Directive itself.  
A third option would be to introduce an auction reserve price through the same mechanism 
used to create the Market Stability Reserve, a formal and binding Decision of the Council and the 
Parliament. Formerly more limited in scope, decisions can nowadays command general application 
under the current wording of Article 288 TFEU. Procedurally, their adoption will not differ 
significantly from the process of elaborating a directive to amend the EU ETS Directive, but they 
may be considered more suited for a relatively specific and focused measure such as the 
introduction of an auction reserve price. In the end all three options will require political support 
and thus a carefully crafted legislative campaign. 
 
                                                 
93 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the 
rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of 
implementing powers, OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, 13–18. The Regulation is currently under review. There are generally two 
types of procedures: the examination and the advisory procedure. The aim is to give an opinion on implementing Acts 
proposed by the Commission. 
94 See also, in more detail, WEMAËRE & BERNHEIM, supra note 60, at 3. 
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IV. DESIGNING AN AUCTION RESERVE PRICE POLICY 
In this section, we address several of the key issues in designing a reserve price: (1) how 
to set the price, (2) how to manage unsold allowances and work with the MSR, (3) how to deal 
with free allocation and (4) windfall profits, and (5) what to do about linking with other systems.  
A. How to Set the Price 
When the European Commission examined options for the EU ETS structural reform, it 
briefly evaluated “discretionary pricing mechanisms.” How to set the price level was a concern 
expressed by the Commission about minimum prices: “They require governance arrangements, 
including a process to decide on the level of the price floor or the levels that would activate the 
reserve. This carries a downside in that the carbon price may become primarily a product of 
administrative and political decisions (or expectations about them), rather than a result of the 
interplay of market supply and demand.”95 The European Commission’s analysis rather naïvely 
assumes that the emissions cap (market supply) has been set efficiently and is not itself “a product 
of administrative and political decisions.”96 The European Commission also raised concerns about 
problems with a “too-high” reserve price producing excessive costs; in particular, if a 
“breakthrough technology” arrives, the price will be needlessly too high.97 The analysis ignores 
the fact that targets are updated in each phase, and if new breakthrough technologies were to arrive, 
the previously set quantity target would be inefficient, being underambitious. In fact, the current 
target is arguably underambitious, because the Renewable Energy Directive has pushed more clean 
technologies into the market, crowding out cost-effective abatement opportunities and widening 
the disparity in marginal abatement costs between the mandated technologies and other options. 
One can address these concerns by recalling the similarities in the intended (though uncertain) 
effects of the MSR intervention and the expected effects of an auction reserve price.  
Who decides and how can an agreement be reached? The mechanisms and responsible 
parties for agreeing on an emissions target should also be sufficient for agreeing on an auction 
reserve price as part and parcel of the emissions target package.  
What should the price be? A fundamental difference in viewpoints has been a debilitating 
factor in policy dialogue around this issue. One view holds that the reserve price should be set such 
that it provides a safety net but is not expected to bind, but critics of this view ask, why bother 
going through so much trouble to introduce a mechanism that is not expected to be influential? 
                                                 
95 See European Commission, supra note 5. 
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This critical perspective was heard in 2008–2009 in response to the suggestion of an auction 
reserve price equivalent to the US Waxman-Markey proposal of $10, because that price was 
deemed too low and not relevant. Ex post, that price rising at 5% plus the rate of inflation, as was 
subsequently adopted in California, would have had an important influence on the program.  
The other viewpoint envisages the introduction of an auction reserve price as a way to put 
the ETS on an entirely different price trajectory. A useful point of reference for this price level 
might be the social cost of carbon (SCC), an economic measure of the value of the global damages 
incurred from emitting an additional ton of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. A recent update 
of the Handbook on External Costs of Transport put a central value of the SCC at €90/ton CO2.98 
However, this price is not necessarily an efficient minimum price (because with the SCC as a 
starting point, the market can drive prices higher, but they cannot go lower), and it may not be a 
feasible political outcome. Other points of reference are the Commission’s expectations of what 
the market price should be, as well as other price floors (€20 in the UK; $17 in California in 
2020).99 The European Commission expects that “the EU ETS will deliver a meaningful carbon 
price and stimulate cost-efficient emission reductions” and calculates an average price in Phase 4 
of €25.100 If these prices are viewed as acceptable by the parties, it should be difficult to argue that 
an auction reserve price at similar levels is excessive. 
From an economic perspective, a “too-high” carbon price would be one that exceeds most 
reasonable values of the SCC. Given the floor price levels being discussed in most jurisdictions, 
unless one believes the SCC would fall dramatically or policy-makers would be overexuberant in 
setting the reserve price, the emergence of a “too-high” reserve price seems highly unlikely and 
easily remedied. 
Price determination also raises a question regarding governance: if the reserve price (or 
price path) should be updated, how will that authority be delegated? These complications can be 
avoided by determining the reserve price path (an initial price and rate of increase) at the outset. 
For example, California set an allowance reserve price of $10 in 2012 that would increase annually 
                                                 
98 Ricardo-AEA, Update of the Handbook on External Costs of Transport: Final Report (Ricardo-AEA/R/ED57769, 
2014). In the 2008 Handbook on External Costs of Transport, the value of €25 was used. 
99 A 2015 analysis by Point Carbon projects EUA prices of €19 in 2020, rising slowly to €31 by 2030 (http://carbon-
pulse.com/3650/). However, market analyses have revised downward price expectations since then (http://carbon-
pulse.com/14954/).  
100 See European Commission, supra note 28. Interestingly, the Impact Assessment does not enunciate carbon price 
projections, but this figure can be calculated from id. at 28: “The total amount of allowances available to be handed 
out for free to industry for the period under assessment (2021 to 2030) is in the order of 6.3 billion allowances. The 
value of these allowances depends on the market price at the time and could be in the order of €160 billion.” 
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by 5% plus the rate of inflation. 101 Now that Phase 4 has already largely been determined, 
incorporating an auction reserve price would require a onetime intervention, but this could still 
occur before the beginning of the phase, which is 2021–2030. 
B. Disposition of Unsold Allowances and Compatibility with the MSR 
In general, allowances that do not sell when the reserve price is triggered can either be 
retired or saved for future auctions. In a standard cap-and-trade system with banking (but no MSR), 
the strongest influence on the allowance market is achieved if allowances that are not sold are 
directly cancelled, since the cumulative supply of allowances is reduced; by contrast, the time-
shifting of selling allowances (backloading) can perpetuate the depression of allowance prices.102 
The MSR adds some complexity to this process, since the mechanism implies that some 
allowances saved into the reserve may ultimately be retired, and some retired allowances may 
allow other backloaded allowances ultimately to be reintroduced, as we explain below. 
In RGGI, the determination of what should be done with allowances that are withheld at 
the price floor is not clearly specified, but an operating practice has been that they are permanently 
cancelled. RGGI’s emissions containment reserve, which was adopted in 2017, specifically 
indicates that allowances that are not sold because prices fall below the reserve price trigger are 
permanently cancelled.103 In California, allowances that are not sold at the reserve price are 
withheld from the market until the price in the quarterly auction has risen above the price floor for 
two consecutive auctions, and thereafter the withheld allowances can slowly be reintroduced in 
subsequent auctions.104 A primary motivation for this provision was to provide revenue stability 
for programs funded by the auction. In 2017, legislation that extended the cap-and-trade program 
through 2030 directs that some of the unsold allowances should be moved to the allowance price 
containment reserve and would enter the market only at high prices, as a form of cost containment. 
Those price levels are to be revised, but in 2019 they range in three steps from $58.34 to $72.93.105  
In the EU ETS, the rules of the MSR will influence the number of saved allowances 
available for future auctions. The key new feature of the MSR, effective from 2023, is that 
allowances held in the reserve above the total number of allowances auctioned during the previous 
                                                 
101 The price floor in the California cap-and-trade program was set at $10 in 2012, and increases 5% annually plus 
inflation. In 2019 the price floor has risen to $15.62. 
https://arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/2019_annual_reserve_price_notice_joint_auction.pdf. 
102 See Knopf et al., supra note 7; WEISHAAR, supra note 24, at 46ff. 
103 https://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Design-Archive/Model-Rule/2017-Program-Review-
Update/2017_Model_Rule_revised.pdf. 
104 https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade/ct_reg_unofficial.pdf at 241. Allowances that remain unsold 
for more than 24 months are moved to the Cost Containment Reserve. 
105 https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/reservesale/2019_reserve_sale_apcr_notice.pdf. 
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year (a declining target that is about 57% of the cap) will no longer be valid. With this design, 
backloading is no longer assured, and allowances may be cancelled instead. When excess 
allowances are cancelled, the waterbed effect is put out of play. For instance, if the MSR is at full 
capacity, extra mitigation efforts that reduce emissions that year will temporarily increase the 
surplus but result in automatic cancellation of allowances the next year. If the bank of allowances 
in circulation falls below its lower threshold (400 million), the MSR begins to empty, and the full 
waterbed effect remains. In between, allowances transferred to the MSR are held and may with 
some probability be cancelled in the future, implying a kind of temporary “puncturing” of the 
waterbed effect.106  
This design feature actually allows an auction reserve price to work with and support the 
aim of the MSR, without any alterations to the overall, agreed supply of allowances or the agreed 
linear reduction factor under the EU ETS. Allowances not sold at auction due to the reserve price 
can simply be added to the MSR. In this manner, an auction reserve price raises the likelihood that 
the MSR will exceed the threshold where excess allowances are subsequently cancelled.  
This insight may trigger companion policies at the EU or Member State level, since these 
would no longer be futile. According to Article 193 TFEU, EU legislative acts based on the 
environmental policy shall not prevent the Member States “from maintaining or introducing more 
stringent protective measures.”107 In other words, EU environmental policy does not entail full 
harmonization; it rather aims at establishing a common minimum level of protection that Member 
States must meet—or exceed. Since the EU-wide cap determines the total emissions, it can be 
questioned whether a Member State action that aims to reduce emissions from installations covered 
by the ETS can indeed qualify as “more stringent,” as long as the waterbed effect remains in place. 
In this situation, incorporating a measure that prevents allowance prices from adjusting fully to 
overlapping policies can allow “more stringent” national policies to still generate additional 
reductions. An auction reserve price could thereby render effective the right of Member States to 
pursue more stringent measures guaranteed in Article 193 TFEU. 
The MSR, with its feed-in triggers and cancellation mechanism, added a layer of 
complexity to an already complex system; introducing a reserve price would simplify the system 
                                                 
106 See Perino, Grischa, New EU ETS Phase 4 rules temporarily puncture waterbed, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE (April 
2018) 8: 260–271. 
107 Such measures must, however, be compatible with other pertinent provisions of the Treaties, such as those relating 
to restrictions on trade between Member States and competition. According to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), 
“more stringent” national measures are those that “pursue the same objective” as an EU legal act or “follow the same 
policy of protecting the environment” as such an act (CJEU Case C-6/03, paras. 38 and 41). Apart from this 
requirement, there seem to be many ways in which a protective measure can be more stringent. For examples, see 
Langlet & Mahmoudi, supra note 26, at 103. 
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and increase predictability of price, even if it is implemented alongside an MSR.108 Furthermore, 
the merits of a reserve price as outlined in Section 2 are still valid. If the MSR itself provides the 
hoped-for price support, adding a reserve price will do no harm; if, however, the MSR falls short, 
incorporating a reserve price will help it live up to expectations.  
C. Dealing with Free Allocation 
The majority of allowances in Phase 4 (57%) are to be allocated by auction, with the 
remainder being freely allocated to sectors exposed to trade and carbon leakage. There are two 
options for dealing with the freely allocated permits. One option is to proceed with direct 
allocations, after which recipients can trade freely, and to support the allowance price strictly 
through an auction reserve price on the auctioned portion of allowances. Precluding adjustments 
to free allocations may result in allowances entering the market even when prices are trading below 
the reserve price. However, for this situation to occur, it would mean that removing the entire 
auctioned supply (a 57% contraction) would be insufficient to support the price to the reserve price 
level. A disadvantage of this approach is that it implies a wealth transfer to recipients of free 
allocations at the expense of the potential use of revenues that would be received by Member States 
through the auction. 
A second approach would be to require recipients of freely allocated allowances to consign 
their allowances to auction, with the proceeds from the auction returned proportionately to the 
original holders of the allowances. A consignment auction for freely distributed allowances has 
been implemented as part of the US sulfur dioxide trading program and is currently part of the 
California CO2 program.
109 If the full allocated budget does not clear at the reserve price, recipients 
will receive a share of their value in proportion to the quantity of allowances they submit originally. 
The value of allocated permits then rises or falls with the total revenues from the auction. This 
option may be viewed as undercompensating trade-exposed firms. If the reserve price is modest, 
this situation occurs only if the market price is relatively low—trading at or below the reserve 
price—in which case competitive pressures are less intense. If the reserve price is at a level where 
competitiveness concerns are serious, then proportional restrictions to free allocation may not be 
desired. 
                                                 
108 One way to make the market stability reserve less complex would be to amend its design such that the decision 
about whether to withhold or reintroduce allowances is based on price triggers. 
109 Burtraw, D. and K. McCormack. Consignment Auctions of Free Emissions Allowances. ENERGY POLICY (2017) 
107: 337-344.  
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D. Addressing Windfall Profits on Banked Allowances 
The introduction of an auction reserve price will change the expected allowance price in 
the future, even if that price is not expected to be binding.110 This effect will convey value to 
private holders of an allowance bank. If the reserve price is set at a level above the current price, 
then it will convey even greater value. Further, updating the reserve price could convey changes 
in the value of allowances. These effects should be carefully considered, and mechanisms might 
be implemented to limit the windfall increase in value if it is substantial. One approach might be 
to discount the value of allowances carried over (banked) from a previous year into Phase 4, which 
is similar to the approach attempted in the Clean Air Interstate Rule at the federal level in the 
United States, when the proposed regulation changed the compliance value (allowances per ton) 
of emissions allowances based on the year they were issued. On the other hand, some windfall 
gains may be useful to build the necessary political support among covered entities for the 
implementation of the reserve price. 
E. Future Issues with Linking to Other Systems 
The EU “aims to link the EU ETS with other compatible systems.”111 Price rigidities are 
therefore a concern in linking discussions. In negotiations between the EU and Australia, the EU 
required Australia to abandon its price floor in order to link to the ETS.112  However, today 
potential linking partners do have reserve prices.  
In linked systems, floor or reserve prices should be aligned to avoid unwanted 
distributional outcomes. With different reserve prices, one of three things would happen: (1) 
Demand for allowances under the combined cap leads to market prices higher than the higher 
reserve price, in which case neither is binding. (2) Combined demand for permits at the higher 
reserve price is less than the combined cap but more than the cap in the lower-reserve-price 
jurisdiction; in this case, the jurisdiction with the lower reserve price sells all permits at the higher 
reserve price, and the jurisdiction with the higher reserve price sells less than its cap, to satisfy the 
demand that remains at that price. (3) Combined demand for permits at the higher reserve price is 
less than the cap in the jurisdiction with the lower reserve price; in this case, the high-reserve-price 
jurisdiction sells no permits. The low-price jurisdiction either sells its entire cap at a clearing price 
between the two reserve prices or, if demand is insufficient, sells an incomplete share of its cap at 
the lower reserve price. In either of the second or third possible outcomes, revenue transfers 
                                                 
110 See Burtraw et al., supra note 18; S. Salant, W. Shobe, & N. Uler, The Effect of “Non-binding” Price Floors on 
the Price of Storable Assets: Emissions Permits and Agricultural Commodities (Aug. 3, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript). 
111 See European Commission, supra note 1. 
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between jurisdictions could result.113 For this and other reasons, successful linking most likely 
requires harmonization of reserve prices. Such harmonization in itself already achieves some of 
the benefits of linking in the form of better price alignment and stability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
An auction reserve price for the EU ETS deserves serious consideration. From an economic 
perspective, a reasonable reserve price for allowance auctions can bolster confidence in allowance 
values, provide transparency, enhance predictability, increase cost-effectiveness, and allow 
overlapping policies by Member States to have truly additional consequences. The barriers to 
implementing an auction reserve price do not appear to be legal: we find no sound support for the 
idea that adding a reserve price in allowance auctions would require a special procedure that 
depends on unanimity in the Council. A reserve price is not equivalent to a tax either legally or 
economically. Rather, a reserve price could be adopted in the ordinary procedure of environmental 
regulations that have the same aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective 
manner. In practice, the effects of a reserve price on allowance prices and auction revenues should 
be similar to the hoped-for effect of the market stability reserve, which was itself implemented by 
a relatively simple Decision to amend the ETS Directive. A reserve price could be incorporated by 
amending that Decision or the Auctioning Regulation in similar fashion. In fact, working together 
with the MSR, an auction reserve price can help ensure that the MSR’s hoped-for effects actually 
materialize.  
In the absence of an EU-wide solution, several individual Member States are formulating 
plans for their own carbon price floors. Such efforts face challenges to design them in ways to 
ensure they contribute to reductions in system-wide emissions rather than create the waterbed 
effect. An important next area for research is then to understand how EU law circumscribes the 
Member State options and compare the economic and environmental effects of feasible 
alternatives.114 
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